| 词汇 | example_english_central-bank |
| 释义 | Examples of central bankThese examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. Following the realization of liquidity shocks, a borrowing bank reports t to the centralbank. We assume that the centralbank uses (2) to guide its policy decisions. But m is observable by the government and can be used to control the behavior of the centralbank. All other choices imply that the centralbank has tried to deceive the public and will therefore lead to severe punishment. Then the public could learn over time whether the centralbank is informed or uninformed. An uninformed centralbank is allowed to choose an inflation target of -, although this would not be optimal. Although no stabilisation credits were employed, centralbank co-operation deserves some credit in the stabilisation of the franc. They did not share equally, however, in the development of centralbank cooperation. Centralbank co-operation remained the best means to deal with these problems and to avoid political demands for unwise policies. This implies that the per-depositor borrowing from the centralbank decreases with the reserve/deposit ratio. Financial cooperation is typically channelled through the host country's centralbank, which then distributes loans to local banks for financing concretely identified projects. By charging a positive interest rate on discount window loans, a centralbank can open a discount window without generating indeterminacy of equilibrium. Credibility problems do not allow the centralbank to carry out an autonomous monetary policy. There were no descriptions or discussions of what was done by the centralbank. The significance of these factors demonstrates that centralbank independence, or lack thereof, is not solely derived from formal rules; non-statutory variables are equally important. In our numerical example, the cost of allowing the other centralbank to learn dominates so optimal monetary policy strategy is cautious. Granting a centralbank a high level of independence is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition for solving the time-inconsistency problem. The adoption of neo-liberal economic policies has lessened the importance of centralbank independence for fighting inflation. The centralbank attempted to contain the rate of the zloty's appreciation by intervening in the forex market within the band. This means that the uninformed centralbank expects beneficial output gains. Let us consider monetary targeting and suppose that the centralbank is uninformed. The preferences of the government are presumably different (at least sometimes) from an independent centralbank, which is more committed to monetary stringency. For some parameter constellations, poor knowledge of the centralbank about future shocks might be socially more beneficial than accurate forecasts. More practically, the loss of credibility by the centralbank will greatly reduce both the maximum achievable net output, and the optimal disinflation length. These larger changes in inflation and output gap induce the centralbank to move its interest rate closer to the natural rate. In our model, it is never necessary for the centralbank to actually forge information. It is probably not very realistic to assume that the centralbank can observe the output gap in the current period. Making the centralbank independent should not be a significant obstacle if a referendum can be won. In principle, banks viewed greater centralbank independence favorably. In the example, the timeconsistent policy is dominated by a simple rule requiring the centralbank to deliver price stability. Centralbank co-operation seems on balance to have achieved little in the interwar period. This leads us to a next related question, does centralbank independence actually mean being able to safeguard low inflation, convincingly? Thus, the problems are not directly related to centralbank independence as such. On one hand, institutional changes within the centralbank were responsible for adopting formally the direct inflation targeting in 1998/1999. It focuses on the economic and political objectives underlying financial reform, and the costs and benefits for government, centralbank, and the banking sector. From this paper's perspective, the most important part of this story was creating the centralbank and the money market. In contrast, however, centralbank independence was not significantly related to inflation rates. It also means that the effect of centralbank independence as a factor determining low inflation outcomes may diminish even further. This study challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between centralbank independence and inflation. Why is centralbank independence so important for fighting inflation? The centralbank, although nominally independent, refused to raise interest rates in the run-up to the elections. Our analysis of these variables also underscores the importance of non-statutory factors in influencing the de facto degree of centralbank independence. In the former case the centralbank is assumed to improve its knowledge of economic models by learning from the information available. To simplify the problem, we assume strict inflation targeting; that is, the centralbank is concerned only with the inflation stabilization. 15. The fifth constraint is the monetary policy strategy used by the foreign centralbank to set nominal interest rates in the future. The main difference is that our centralbank cares about the nominal exchange rate rather than the inflation rate. Therefore, if the centralbank were actually to deviate, it has an incentive to abandon the punishment path in favor of a more attractive equilibrium. We assume that the signal is private information available only to the centralbank and not verifiable for the public. Subsequently, the centralbank chooses its monetary policy. The centralbank, by committing to a persistent response to a cost-push shock, induces an undershooting inflation. Of course, we are using a highly stylized mechanism enabling the centralbank to commit itself to targets. The centralbank is assumed to know the expectation formation mechanism in full. A centralbank could, for example, be equally concerned about seasonal movements in the price level or the rate of inflation. The centralbank receives a higher grant element in order to guarantee for the general country and special currency risks. The striking result, however, is the fact that the conservative centralbank seldom achieves both properties together-that is, low inflation at no cost. It's an extremely damaging thing in itself for a centralbank to get caught up in politics and corruption. Substituting this back into (25), the zero-profit condition of the centralbank implies the equilibrium discount-window rate given by (26). Note that the above results do not deal with credibility problems that the centralbank would likely face with longer disinflations. Banking crises may or may not occur in this equilibrium, depending on the exact policies followed by the centralbank. This knowledge about the precision of the central bank's information and forecasts may be available to the centralbank, but not to the public. Without loss of generality, assume that the centralbank writes identical contracts with each of the (ex ante) identical banks. Under monetary targeting, the centralbank simply announces a money growth target which can be controlled exactly. By 1928, political rivalries and conceptual differences had arrested the development of centralbank co-operation. This initiative reopened an avenue for centralbank co-operation. This frequently led to local branches ignoring orders from the centralbank and subordinating themselves to local influences. For a centralbank that has observed a negative shock or that is uninformed, no profitable deviation from the constructed equilibrium can exist. There is little analysis of how such a centralbank can best move from its current policy to an optimal commitment policy. The crowning achievement of the reformists, the 1990 law on money and credit, established the independence of the centralbank. Politicians attempted to use a variety of informal and formal channels to influence centralbank policy. The pre-war gold standard offered neither justification nor opportunity for continuous centralbank co-operation. It was a strong centralbank, able to oppose and to insist, largely independent from the government. In contrast, centralbank independence was significantly and positively related to changes in inflation. How have monetary policy and centralbank culture developed in other countries with universal financial structures. Apart from the specific national unease with centralbank independence, general concern remains for four reasons. Even if we assume that the indexes accurately measure centralbank independence, we cannot assume that they accurately capture the theoretical concern for non-accommodation. Indeed, local branches of the centralbank often became an effective instrument for local governments to promote local economic growth. Moreover, the determination of the new centralbank to demonstrate its resolve and credibility may bias it in a deflationary direction. In many cases, the cost of the other centralbank learning is sufficiently high that it completely dominates. The threat of increased exposure to exploitative actions from the other centralbank greatly attenuates the incentive to follow an activist monetary policy strategy. Money could, for example, be used to signal the policy intentions of the centralbank. The centralbank chooses policy in accordance with the discretionary, rational expectations rule, which maximizes (2). We will completely abstract from the monetary transmission mechanism and simply assume that the centralbank controls inflation by means of the output gap. In other words, the centralbank must set its two policies in such a way that banks demand a positive amount of reserves. On the basis of this result, some economists and policymakers have argued that price-level stability should be the main goal of a centralbank. Does it represent "good" monetary policy for any centralbank to eliminate seasonal variability in nominal rates of interest? In this arrangement, the centralbank is an individual monitoring bank that intermediates between many lending and borrowing banks. It follows how an institution such as a centralbank can arise to mitigate the coordination problem. What are socially desirable operating rules for a centralbank? One might argue that no centralbank in industrial countries has recently tried to stimulate economy by creating surprise inflation. One also might suspect that the centralbank learns over time. Under the monetary targeting scenario, the public knows for sure which choice of monetary growth m the centralbank will make. Accordingly, the probability of the centralbank being informed could increase. We obtain the benchmark results under monetary targeting and inflation targeting, as the centralbank can commit to low inflation. Inflation targets are more closely related to future inflation and thus make it easier for the centralbank to commit to low inflation. This means that an informed centralbank can choose a monetary policy, resulting in an inflation rate that differs from the announced target. One might argue that the centralbank could overcome the time-inconsistency problem by building up a reputation. These examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. |
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