| 词汇 | example_english_president |
| 释义 | Examples of presidentThese examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. The president's partial and strong role, combined with some implicit and explicit pressures towards uniformity, further decreased potential challenges. More members move away from the president's position following each election than towards it. Since presidents do sometimes support such laws, the question becomes, under what circumstances will they do so? In the case of the president's party, the relationship between performance and the vote contradicts standard referendum theories of economic voting. Of the 273 executive appointments, 182 (or 66.7 percent) went to lame-duck members of the president's party. The incidence of such appointments should covary positively with the president's powers and negatively with the prime minister's electoral prospects. Evidence suggests that this governing board regularly exercises effective oversight of the president's activities. Unfortunately for presidents, the number of agencies created by statute has increased over time, as has the number of agencies with insulating characteristics. Individual decisions to insulate agencies from presidential control collectively and cumulatively are making the bureaucracy more difficult for presidents to manage over time. Strengthening this force was seen as undermining the president's grip on power and consolidating that of his deputy defence minister. Provincial rivalries for power were slowly eliminated, internal conflict reduced, and presidents succeeded one another observing the principle of no re-election. The names of kings, generals, and presidents have a prominent status and size within the inscriptions. Variation in a president's support/executive coalition in the legislature affects her ability to control the executive branch. Therefore, presidents have incentives to control bureaucrats who oppose their policies. The answer is that presidents have agency problems too. The answer is simple: the president's bargaining power. Governors and presidents appoint department heads and their principal deputies. The beleaguered president's appeals for support served only to reveal to the public at large the weakness of his regime. While mutually dependent, the relationship between presidents and provincial governors was not one of equal partners. Despite the president's popularity at the polls, all was not well. When the president's party likes the outcome of the legislative impasse, presidents willingly go down to defeat. Is it true that when no coalitions are formed, presidents are legislatively unsuccessful? Despite this, the police remain a core security actor and presidents rarely ignore them. They also supported the president's economic-reform program from 1989-91. The president's recognition by the state hampered the ability of group members to replace her. However, crises do not suddenly turn the presidents of weakened states into all-powerful rulers or allow them to operate in a political vacuum. Clearly, the president's announcement heralded a major initiative. In 1885, there was no resolution on direct representation; however, it was called for in the president's report. Relying on realignment theory, some scholars imply that presidents seek to shape judicial interpretation primarily for reasons of partisanship. In fact, they represent one extreme of the president's complex approach toward civil (and human) rights. A necessity for successful leadership is the president's ability to define the public's understanding of the issues. In short, presidents not only teach, they sell. In another respect, however, these issues are fully comparable as independent choices by presidents promoting their own policy initiatives. A president's ability to respond to these expectations reflects his own sense of reform's priority. Reform orientation is an indicator of the president's propensity toward innovation and independent action. Second, individual level characteristics do not sufficiently explain why a president's actions are invested toward a specific set of goals. Instead, the first six presidents often spoke about their own venerable character or sense of duty that served as a qualification for public office. I hypothesize that the intensity of a president's personal commitment to policy change will affect his use of strategic resources for change. Coming on the heels of a discredited regime, reconstructive presidents re105. Justices can be reasonably confident that presidents sharing their core political commitments are likely to nominate justices who do the same. Thus, there were twice as many cases of lame-duck members of the president's party voting against his request. Overall, there were thirteen extra sessions during this period, called by eight different presidents. When executive-request roll calls are analyzed, there is little evidence that lame ducks of the president's party altered their preferences to support his initiatives. Plebiscitary presidents do not labor under the expectation of "visionary" leadership. Second, as the minority party, the president's partisans would have limited leverage to influence the adoption of new institutional practices. We also replicated these analyses using a variable measuring the positive image of the president's economic policy. Most observers agree that presidents do not hold a press conference unless it can help them achieve some goal. All else equal, presidents and prime ministers therefore prefer to avoid such confrontations whenever possible. Perhaps lack of virtue could be the justificatory approach taken by those who approved of the police president's decision. None of the four main candidates was backed by the government, or was from the then president's party. In his first five months in office, he issued more emergency decrees (thirty) than had all previous presidents combined. As was the case for incumbent presidents, we considered justices' loyalties to be fluid as the party system evolved in the early nineteenth century. Through biographical information and examinations of their jurisprudence it is possible to ascertain justices' ideological affiliation (or lack thereof) with the presidents of the period. Such perceptions hurt the president's authority and also his electoral fortunes. The good news for presidents is that agency structure is more malleable than usually recognized. To call one "traditional" and the others "modern-like" obscures their shared context and the new expectations by which all three presidents succeeded or failed. Now the presidential addresses are all about the individual interests of the presidents, which particular anthropological group they are representing. Few historians would disagree that the 1910s, when four presidents failed to serve out their terms, qualify as politically unstable. Not surprisingly, the president's approval rate drastically diminished during his second term. Though centralising revenue forces countries to forego the long-term efficiency gains promised by decentralisation, liberalising presidents, like most politicians, tend to have short time horizons. Since the 1960s, presidents have relied primarily on prime time, nationally televised speeches and press conferences for this purpose. In fact, it will be costly for presidents not to insulate if the preferences of future presidents differ substantially from their own. In fact, our options for rating retiring presidents are quite limited. Although presidents may occasionally be able to insert themselves into the policy process, they are not expected to stand in the way of effective government. The previous twenty-five years saw an increase from six (16.7 per cent) to twelve (26.1 per cent) in the number and share of parliament-selected presidents. Public opinion, therefore, interacts with formal institutional rules affecting the rate at which presidents can shape public policy. At the midterm, moderate voters possess full knowledge of the president's partisan affiliation and can tailor their congressional vote to dilute the president's power. Thus, comparing the performance of presidents and legislatures, or of both branches under different electoral circumstances, is not necessarily relevant to our theoretical concerns. In every mid-term year, the president's party faced a partisan tide against it. In other words, he looks to see whether presidents can use the power of persuasion to attract and retain votes. Thus, even under unified government, only four of the eight legislators would represent the president's party. Recalcitrant assemblies reject the executive's initiatives and provoke imperial presidents to undertake unilateral action. There is, of course, nothing new about presidents using their police for political ends. However, in an open defiance of the life president's advice, the majority voted for the multiparty cause in the 1993 referendum. In terms of the "retired" dummy variables, there are more cases of positive coefficients for the other party (six) than for the president's party (three). In retrospect, such optimism was premature and severely underestimated the president's political skills and staying power. The president's desire to diffuse the crisis at home and restore a semblance of respectability abroad necessarily required visible changes in domestic governance. When disputes broke out between presidents and partisan editors of the official organ, it was usually the partisan editor who suffered the consequences. The president's control over the official organ guaranteed that he would have a mouthpiece to present his agenda if needed. 20. However, the president's choice of language suggests that he was reacting as well to signals he perceived in his political environment. First, these were presidents with minimal institutional resources. Other studies have found that the president's decision to issue a disaster declaration is influenced by congressional and media attention. From their position within the separated system, presidents can join legislative, executive, and judicial functions in creative and variegated ways. The periodic disruption of a change in office presents presidents with a speculative opportunity to press their agenda. Incumbent presidents used every resource to stay in power. The president's gift for hyperbole served him poorly. The president's greatest skill had been in deluding those who, trusting him, rallied to 54 degrees, 40 minutes. Political leaders and presidents increasingly seem to run government in a directly personalized, discretionary way. To summarize, presidents do not depend on the trading of favours alone. The first thing to be said is that the" circumstantial variables" of a president's incumbency may give him important advantages. A president's support for a legislator's pet bill may be vital to its passage. A woman has appeared in the president's life and the relationship is being used to smear the president's reputation. The president's adversaries appeared literally consumed with hatred for him ; the bigger the stakes, the smaller they acted. I have identified the presence of two reasonably coherent patronage regimes, each with its own patterned, stable and distinctive use of the president's appointment power. Firm presidents with finance backgrounds were more likely to head profitable firms that have high stock market evaluations. In his analyses, he includes sociological variables - such as the background of firm presidents and the firm's relationship to other firms. Moreover, the three-party balance fostered coalition government, making it especially difficult for presidents to pass legislation that would strip the judiciary of its autonomy. When presidents have had the unfettered right to remove judges, for instance, judicial figures have accepted their subordinate roles. Where new democracies are fragile, presidents may favour decentralisation as a means of furthering the democratisation process itself.#! These examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. |
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