| 词汇 | example_english_positivism |
| 释义 | Examples of positivismThese examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. If so, there would be no benefit in choosing exclusive over inclusive legal positivism on this ground. Now labelled as 'positivism' and described negatively, archival research has fallen from its pinnacle of high esteem. I have argued only that such criteria are compatible with legal positivism and the concept of law. Still, criterialism is hopeless, quite apart from any alleged connection it may or may not have to positivism. In a sense, the narrative of the whole book is familiar: a movement from positivism to postmodern scepticism; from bardolatry to bardicide. The persistence of positivism in social science is powerful. Present-day scholars have often associated positivism with turn-of-the-century scientific racism and the view of race as a biological category. As a political philosophy, his special brand of positivism was fruitless, and open to obvious and grave objections. If, however, he attributes the inference to positivism, his failure is interpretive. 15. The most important of these attributions is the claim that positivism is committed to a criterial semantics. The idea that positivism is committed to this empirical claim is problematic for two reasons. Anchored as it is to criterialism, positivism sinks along with it. In any case, legal positivism does not purport to be an empirical claim about how people happen to determine the content of law. If my scenario proposes an abandonment of soft positivism, it does so only for settings where the retention of soft positivism is infeasible. The revolutionary expansion of mathematics called into question the naive belief in sense data on which positivism seemed to be based. What legal positivism must account for in terms of its own basic commitments is simply the fact that moral norms do figure importantly in adjudication. Because his accounts of the general ambitions and specific claims of legal positivism have sometimes been bemusingly distortive, his genuinely important challenges can become obscured. One scenario was devised from the perspective of urban history, and derived its positivism from unimpeachably materialist-reductionist credentials. My suggestion is not a counsel of scientism, positivism, or perfection. The result of the pervading influence of positivism in the seats of higher learning was to consider mainly quantifiable knowledge as admissible. However, positivism as practised in mid-century and adopted wholesale by some archaeologists is dead. While there is nothing in positivism that entails a commitment to (1), positivism is distinguished from other theories of law by its commitment to (2). The ver y label "legal positivism" reflects these core commitments. Hence, he concluded that legal positivism was fatally flawed. If this means that all evaluative considerations are not genuinely evaluative, then legal positivism is vindicated. The important question, in other words, is not whether my argument, if successful, refutes "legal positivism," but rather its implications for understanding law. Thus, it follows that positivism is inconsistent with the existence of legally authoritative principles. He thus decides to begin with positivism and the modernising sway of 1880 and end with the transition to democracy in 1983. The weak natural law thesis may, however, be contrary to the spirit of positivism. In the natural sciences, positivism rejected any reality beyond intellectual and empirical reach. In addition, his use of the concept of "positivism" lumps together different viewpoints and overrates the significance of epistemological views for social-scientific practice. Legal positivism vigorously protects rights through the stipulations of its own system, and most rights welcome the specificity of statute and case law. The first problem is the relationship between cultural nationalism and late nineteenth-century positivism. Each suggests a variant of one of the most common contemporary way stations between positivism and postmodernism-the call to deliberation and debate. Comtean positivism popularized this distinction between science and philosophy, but it also viewed science as having supplanted philosophy. With their all-out attack on positivism and the "dehumanizing, counterrevolutionary" nature of its concepts, they threw out the baby with the bathwater. Of the three tenets of positivism, only the first is upheld by all four responses to the freedom-determinacy dilemma. Locked in a head-on confrontation with classical positivism, legal realism utterly rejects the second and third tenets of positivism defined above. Despite or because of the feeling of living in an age of positivism and disenchantment, these collections emerged only after 1860. The demise of positivism as a scientific style has been responsible for this happy confluence. The battle-cry of early, nineteenth-century positivism, that of the "natural scientific world-view," expressed these tendencies fully - and in its concrete content already foreshadowed their demise. The first issue is the difference between, on the one hand, positivism, objectivity, or realism and, on the other, idealism, interactionism, interpretivism, or subjectivity. The earliest challenges to positivism, however, emerged from the symbolic interactionists. A third line of work by this school, however, represented a more radical challenge to positivism. During the heyday of positivism, it was quite the rage. The other tendency is to assume that positivism is the dominant epistemological orientation in social science. Each can provide a coherent and plausible account of the way morality figures in adjudication, consistent with the basic tenets of positivism. There is nothing in positivism or natural law theory that warrants or suggests such a convergence of views. Legal positivism, so this argument might go, emerged as an attempt to make clear the distinction between law and morality. I believe that identifying anything other than that makes legal positivism at best a wholly uninteresting thesis. There was also a rise of "civil" or secular religions such as positivism. The second orientation, "anarcho-autonomy," emphasizes positivism, reason, and realism. Positivism explains legal validity-and not the concept of law-in terms of shared criteria. On this view, the point of positivism is to give a conceptual account of what distinguishes systems of law from other systems of norms. Furthermore, the development of diffusion research within the social sciences took place at a time when positivism was all the rage in these disciplines. Legal positivism, which also upholds the last two tenets, is thus committed to the thesis of the determinacy of decisions by the legal system. All we are given by way of causal explanation is the quantitative positivism of affinity theory. Take, for example, the much-maligned adoption of logical empiricism - logical positivism if you will. To the degree that mathematics could be invoked against positivism, mathematics would serve as a tool for the liberation from science. The problem with inclusive legal positivism is that it countenances rules that are incapable of either directly or indirectly epistemically guiding conduct. Few humanists, who have had at least a century of dealing with the positivism and scientism inherent in modernism, would argue with this sentiment. In recent discussions, many have wondered whether legal positivism can permit moral appropriateness to be a possible condition of legality. The first stage, that of every writing and every reading in their infancy, is that of positivism. Like biomedicine the aim of positivism is to reduce explanations of all phenomena to the smallest number of principles or laws. A key tenet of positivism is that all scientific knowledge should be acquired in the same manner. In this paper we will argue that the distinction between these two archaeological -isms (positivism and postprocessualism/interpretative archaeology) is divisive and unnecessary. Positivism and statistical analysis are powerful tools, and have been successfully deployed to encourage rational and responsive criminal justice policy. Managerialism and positivism, however, shy away from this evident value-fact relationship. Although these theses are hardly precise, they do possess suf ficient content to distinguish legal positivism from certain other theories. To the extent that positivism attempts to explain the concept of law in terms of such semantics, it fails as a theor y of law. Positivism does not claim that there are shared criteria of legal validity that cut across possible legal systems. There is, perhaps, a sense in which conceptualism may be thought not simply to entail, but actually to constitute, a form of positivism. All three philosophers painted alternatives to twentieth-century versions of positivism. When measured against the criteria appropriate to interpretive theories, both positivism and pragmatism pale in comparison to law-as-integrity. The tendency to view differences between peoples and nations in racial terms was another key legacy of positivism. In this sense, nineteenthcentury positivism was insufficiently radical because it was ontologically skeptical. On this interpretation of conventionalism, the distinction between matters of fact and value judgments is a legacy of positivism the conventionalist wishes to retain. How, then, does positivism deal with the problem of induction? What advocates of such a division overlooked was the possibility that positivism would reign in the social sciences while no longer functioning as a philosophy of science! There, the issue was not so much the dominance of positivism as a philosophical position, as it was the almost ubiquitous association of the 'scientific method' with socialist ambitions. The idea that positivism seeks 27. Moreover, even if his work as a whole were less prominent and impressive than it is, some of his onslaughts against positivism have an independent significance. Terms like scientism, positivism, empiricism, orality, multi-vocal, narrative, hybrid, contingent, disjunction, resistance, conflict, hegemony, critical awareness, and a host of others, pepper the writing. Since positivism understood the acquisition of knowledge as meaning the acquisition of scientific knowledge, it had to posit scientific activity as an ahistorical potential existing in all cultures. Positivism, we saw, endorses both these tenets. In this tradition the belief is that positivism's search for social causes is illusory, falling into the trap of determinism. Legal positivists have been forced to explain, in a way that is consistent with positivism's basic tenets, the apparent fact that moral principles can sometimes be binding legal sources. In this way, aesthetic activity offered a form of knowledge, but a form which was different to the abstract forms of scientific positivism. Rehabilitation is another manifestation of positivism which was under general attack at this time. In contrast, positivism regards only that which is observable to the senses as real and hence susceptible to explanation. If it did, it would degenerate into data-driven positivism with counting as its only methodology. The epistemological beliefs characterising new course economics were the ideals of a naive empiricism rather than those of modern critical positivism. Jurisprudential counterparts are found in legal realism, neo-legal positivism, critical legal studies, and the economic theory of law (rational choice theory). One then need only argue that, since there are no independent epistemic foundations, both logical positivism and methodology are wrong. The other thread is an opposite one to positivism. In essence, positivism depends principally on being able to challenge predictions set up as hypotheses and on attempting to falsify them. As we saw above, measuring outcomes which take the perspective of people with dementia challenges positivism and quantitative methods. Within mainstream health services research, the biomedical model has been supported by positivism. Broadly, these tensions result from two diametrically opposed approaches to social research- positivism and naturalism. Inclusive legal positivism is mentioned in passing in a note. These examples are from corpora and from sources on the web. Any opinions in the examples do not represent the opinion of the Cambridge Dictionary editors or of Cambridge University Press or its licensors. |
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